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In the aftermath of the June 2010 violence in South Kyrgyzstan, much scholarly attention has 
focused on the causes of the violence. However, observers have taken little notice of the fact 
that while such urban areas as Osh, Jalal-Abad and Bazar-Korgon were caught up in violence, 
some towns in South Kyrgyzstan that are located in close proximity to the conflict sites and 
had considerable conflict potential had managed to avoid the violence. Thus, while the 
question “What were the causes of the June 2010 violence?" is important, we have few 
answers to the question: ”Why did the conflict break out in some geographic sites but not in 
other places with similar conflict potential?” Located in the theoretical literature on ‘the local 
turn’ within peacekeeping studies, this chapter is based on extensive empirical fieldwork to 
explore the local and micro-level dimensions of peacekeeping. It seeks to understand why 
and how local leaders and residents in some geographic places in South Kyrgyzstan managed 
to prevent the deadly clashes associated with Osh, Jalal-Abad and Bazar Korgon. The main 
focus of the project is on Aravan, a town with mixed ethnic population where residents 
managed to avert interethnic clashes during the June 2010 unrest. The answers to the question 
about why violence didn’t occur can yield important lessons for conflict management not 
only for South Kyrgyzstan, but also for the entire Central Asian region. 
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Why does ethnic violence occur in some places and not in other similar ones where it 
might be expected? This has emerged as an important question in what we call the ‘local 
turn’ in peacekeeping and peacebuilding studies. This chapter contributes to this debate by 
offering a detailed analysis of how violence was averted in the Kyrgyzstani town of Aravan 
in June 2010. 
On 19 May 2010, clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in Jalal-Abad, 
one of Kyrgyzstan’s southern provinces, leaving at least two people dead and 71 injured. The 
Jalal-Abad confrontation was a prelude to a full-blown interethnic conflict that engulfed 
South Kyrgyzstan in early June 2010. The conflict reportedly erupted following an altercation 
between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths in a small café on June 10-11 in Osh city. On June 
12, clashes broke out again in Jalal-Abad. As the violence spread in South Kyrgyzstan, ethnic 
Uzbeks appeared to be a minority group under siege. Unable to contain the violence, the 
provisional government appealed to the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) for security assistance. The CSTO declined to intervene, citing restrictions in the 
mandate of the organization.  
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The violent conflict was a devastating blow to Kyrgyz authorities’’ efforts to stabilize 
the country two months after the April 2010 violent protests that had toppled a government. 
According to official estimates, more than 400 people died and thousands were injured during 
the week-long unrest. According to UN data, 1749 buildings were destroyed. The monetary 
cost from the violence was estimated by Kyrgyz officials at $500 million. The interethnic 
clashes had also created a regional displacement crisis. The UN estimated that the conflict 
created close to 300,000, mostly Uzbek, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 75,000 
refugees. The region was also engulfed by a humanitarian disaster brought on by the 
disruption in the normal supply chains for food, and other goods (Nichol 2005; Melvin 2011). 
In the aftermath of the June 2010 violence in South Kyrgyzstan, much scholarly 
attention has focused on the causes of the violence. Kyrgyz and Uzbek observers emphasized 
historical causes, pointing to the centuries-old rivalry and ethnic hatred between the two 
groups.2 Some Central Asia scholars argued that economic disparities among various identity 
groups played a far more important role than the historical hatred (New York Times, June 14, 
2010). A third line of analysis, mainly Western analytical agencies and human rights 
organizations, emphasized state weakness as the major factor that led up to the violence (ICG 
2010; Melvin 2011). The fourth set of observers claimed that the violence was instigated by 
the supporters of former President Kurmanbek Bakiev and by opportunistic Uzbek 
community leaders bent on establishing Uzbek autonomy in the South (Myrzakmatov 2011). 
Finally, a group of scholars claimed that “the geopolitical interests of both Russia and the 
West, and the opportunities for corruption provided by Western financial offshoring 
arrangements, were important factors exacerbating the instability” (Megoran, Satybaldieva, 
Lewis, Heathershaw 2014). 
In the wake of the June 2010 violence, interpretations of the events varied markedly. 
International Crisis Group claimed that the events were ethnically-targeted pogroms 
committed with assistance of state structures. The 2011 report by the OSCE’s Kyrgyz Inquiry 
Commission (KIC report 2011) claimed that given the scale of violence, it could be classified 
as “crimes against humanity.” The Kyrgyz government rejected such a definition, claiming 
that the June 2010 events were an inter-ethnic riot instigated by Uzbek separatists and the 
supporters of Bakiyev.  
Five years after the violence, interpretations of the events are still a source of 
contention. Uzbeks continue to assert that the June 2010 events Kyrgyz crowds carried out 
the majority of the violence and complain that they are excluded from political and economic 
life. They also lament they are still being mistreated by Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies – 
an allegation supported by international research, such as a June 2011 Human Rights Watch 
report detailing extensive torture and unfair trials pinning most of the blame on Uzbeks, even 
though Uzbeks suffered the majority of casualties. Many Kyrgyz, following increasingly 
nationalist rhetoric in parliament, reject claims that Uzbeks suffered disproportionately, 
blaming the Uzbek leaders of attempting to secede from Kyrgyzstan and thus triggering the 
unrest. In the wake of the June 2010 events, several Uzbek leaders fled the country and found 
refuge in Turkey and a number of Western countries. In a latest controversial measure, the 
Kyrgyz Prosecutor’s office launched an inquiry into the details of an escape by Uzbek leaders 
from Kyrgyzstan (Eurasianet, September 16, 2016).  
Meanwhile, preoccupied with the causes of the violence, policy-makers, analysts, and 
scholars have paid insufficient attention to the geographic variation in the extent of violence. 
In other words, observers took little notice of the fact that while such urban areas as Osh and 
Jalal-Abad were caught up in violence, some towns in South Kyrgyzstan that are located in 
close proximity to the conflict sites and had considerable conflict potential had managed to 
avoid the violence. Thus, while the question “What were the causes of the June 2010 
violence?” is important, we have few answers to the question ”Why did the conflict break out 
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in some geographic sites but not in other places with similar conflict potential?” With the 
exception of the emerging work of sociologist Joldon Kutmanaliev (Kutmanaliev 2015), this 
question has not been explored by detailed fieldwork. This is a major shortcoming of the 
literature, because the answers to this question may yield crucial lessons for conflict 
management not only for South Kyrgyzstan, but also for the Central Asia region. Eye-witness 
reports indicate that Aravan (and other similar towns such as Uzgen) saw ethnically-based 
mobilization in response to the events in Osh and Jalal-Abad. It was on the brink of 
potentially devastating violence. At the same time, eye witness accounts show that locals had 
engaged in a series of conflict prevention management measures that prevented ethnic 
conflict from spiraling into ethnic violence. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we locate it within the ‘local turn’ in the 
literature on peacekeeping studies. Secondly, we explain the methods we used to answer our 
research question. Thirdly, we outline socioeconomic conditions in Osh and Aravan prior to 
the June 2010 events and explain how they differed. Fourthly, the substantive section 
describes why the inter-ethnic violence erupted in Osh but not in Aravan. In particular, the 
section details the tools and mechanisms utilized by community leaders and residents in Osh 
and Aravan to avoid the violence. We demonstrate how, in Osh, several prominent Uzbek 
leaders and Kyrgyz law enforcement officials worked together to prevent a major violence, 
but when their peacebuilding work was disrupted, a major conflict erupted. In Aravan, in 
contrast, the section focuses on the crucial work of an ad-hoc group, the Aravan Committee 
for Restoring Stability, which formed in the midst of the crisis by leading representatives of 
both communities and assumed extraordinary powers of government during the emergency. 
The chapter concludes with reflections on the implications of our findings on the broader 
literature on peacebuilding in Central Asia. 
  This paper advances two arguments to explain why the leaders and the residents in 
Osh failed to stop the violence and why the local activists and residents of Aravan managed 
to avoid the violence associated with Osh. First, there were important structural differences 
between the two areas. Unlike large urban centers such as Osh and Jalal-Abad, Aravan did 
not witness massive in-migration of rural residents and a correspondent change in the 
demographic profile over the past two decades. Second, the role played by local elites 
account for the differences in outcomes between Aravan on one hand and Osh on the other. 
Unlike leaders in Osh, local activists in Aravan had stronger “horizontal” ties with each other, 
and they were able to better coordinate amongst themselves because the Aravan area had 
fewer people than Osh. Whereas elites in Osh lacked “vertical” ties to the crowds of mobsters 
that attacked Osh neighborhoods, local elites in Aravan maintained direct personal ties with 
and control over people who mobilized in response to the outbreak of violence in Osh.  
1: Why doesn’t violence occur? The local turn in peacekeeping studies 
Conceptually, this work is located within what might be described as ‘the local turn’ 
within peacekeeping studies, a subdivision of the broader scholarly endeavour to understand 
modern political process of ‘peacebuilding.’ A body of literature has been developed by 
political scientists, geographers and others on what Autesserre terms ‘bottom-up 
peacekeeping’ (Auteserre 2014). In contrast to the previous focus on peacekeeping as a 
technique of foreign intervention epitomised by the post-Cold War ‘liberal peace’(Richmond 
2008), this work explores local and micro-level dimensions of peacekeeping, and is 
characterised by the inclusion of a wider range of actors in its analysis (Goetschel and 
Hagmann 2009).  
The importance of ‘the local’ (understood as subnational conflicts and dynamics) in 
state-wide civil has been demonstrated in the work of Kalyvas (Kalyvas, 2003, 2006). But the 
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‘local turn’ within peacekeeping is rather on ways in which local/subnational actors manage 
to prevent, contain, or de-escalate violence that in other circumstances external peacekeepers 
might be called on to address.  
Two major directions of research can be identified within this literature. The first is 
on local-international divergences, or how local actors resist, co-opt, transform or adapt 
international practices. Research by Séverine Autesserre and Lisa Smirl focus on the 
peacekeepers themselves, and how their assumptions, spaces and practices insulate them 
from understandings of peace in the local communities through which they move (Autessere 
2014; Smirl 2011). Richmond draws attention to the frequent mismatch between local 
conceptions of peace and those held by international practitioners (Richmond 2008). In the 
cases of Tajikistan and Central Africa, John Heathershaw and Patricia Daley respectively 
have shown how local actors subvert international peacekeeping and peacebuilding norms 
and practices for their own ends (Heathershaw 2009; Daley 2014). Perhaps ironically, this 
scholarship remains conceptually within the terrain mapped out by liberal peacekeeping 
because it is primarily engaged in critiquing it. A more creative alternative is seen in the work 
of Sara Koopman’s research on the San Jose peace community in Colombia (Koopman 2011, 
2014). An ethnography of protective accompaniment, it explores how international pacifists 
collaborate with threatened local communities to make spaces for peace and security entirely 
outside of state military, paramilitary and criminal forces.  
The literature on the liberal peace has been critiqued for focusing primarily on what 
Lise Howard calls “the disastrous failures” (Howard 2008). Page Fortna argues that it is 
important to compare these against places where violence did not occur or was controlled 
(Page Fortna 2008). Studies of the factors behind successful peacekeeping operations have 
been conducted by Fortna, Howard, and others (Barron and Burke 2008). But these remain 
studies of places where violence did occur. An equally important question is why violence 
did not occur and thus why such interventions were not required.  
The second major body of work within the ‘local turn’ is on why violent conflict has 
not occurred in certain places where it might have been expected. In separate studies on the 
same two Bosnian towns, Adam Moore and Florian Bieber examine the reasons why post-
war peacebuilding was more successful in Brčko than Mostar (Bieber 2005; Moore 2013). 
However, the most sustained research into this question has been in South Asia. The all-too 
frequent descent of Indian cities into inter-communal (Muslim/Hindu) violence has often 
followed a grimly-identifiable pattern. A single incident (the theft of an idol or a supposed 
lock of a prophet’s hair, the murder of a prominent individual, the desecration of a sacred 
site, etc.) provokes a response: ‘One reaction then leads to another, generating a chain, which 
if not immediately contained will lead to a major conflagration’ (Brass 1997, 257). However, 
Paul Brass and others are particularly interested in why certain precipitating incidents don’t 
lead to violence.  
Philippa Williams provides a particularly good example from the city of Varanasi. In 
March 2006, suspected Muslim terrorists bombed a temple and other Hindu sites. In other 
similar cases in India such attacks have led to communal retaliatory violence, but that did not 
occur here, in spite of both local and national precedents and the attempts of some extremists 
to make political capital from the attacks. Williams’ fieldwork carefully explores why not. 
She uncovers a story of the crucial role played by local Hindu and Muslim leaders, the 
decisive action of central government building on a recent history of conciliatory moves to 
Muslims, a good tradition of communal relations, and associational ties in networks such as 
the silk industry that cut across communal divides (Williams 2007). Ashutosh Varshney 
argues that it is the existence of exactly such interethnic associational networks that play vital 
roles in preventing ethnic conflict (inevitable in mixed societies which are free to organise) 
escalating into ethnic violence in India (Varshney 2001).  
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Plenty of studies critique the project of liberal peace in Central Asia (Heathershaw 
2009; Bichsel 2009; Reeves 2014; Megoran et all 2014; Ismailbekova and Sultanaliev 2012), 
but few explore alternative mechanisms of conflict management. David Lewis and Alisher 
Khamidov look at alternative ‘illiberal’ conflict prevention mechanisms used by strong 
central states in responding to the 2010 violence (Lewis 2015; Khamidov 2015). From a 
different perspective, Madina Akhmetshina considers women’s domestic sheltering during 
the same events (Akhmetshina 2012), and Aksana Ismailbekova identifies neighbourhood 
strategies for avoiding conflict in their aftermath (Ismailbekova 2013). But Joldon 
Kutmanaliev’s emerging work is almost alone in providing a detailed interrogation of why 
violence occurred in some parts of Osh in 2010 yet not others (Kutmanaliev 2015), and (in 
this volume) why it did not occur in the neighboring small town of Uzgen, even though 
tensions were very high in a place that had been the epicenter of a similar tragedy two 
decades earlier (Tishkov 1995; Asankanov 1996). This chapter is a contribution to this much-
needed literature on why interethnic conflict does not escalate into interethnic violence. 
2: Methods 
Research for this chapter was conducted in Aravan by the lead researcher (who comes 
from the town) in 2013 and 2015, which built on prior research in the same place in 2009. 
The researcher was in Aravan during the 2010 violence and was eyewitness to many of the 
events described herein. For reasons of impartiality and to conduct research amongst Kyrgyz 
actors, we employed a Kyrgyz research assistant. Originally from Batken oblast, the research 
assistant was educated at OSCE Academy-Bishkek where he completed his MA thesis on 
religious leaders in South Kyrgyzstan. Apart from being fluent in Kyrgyz and Uzbek, he 
demonstrated in-depth knowledge of qualitative research methods. Megoran, as co-author and 
research co-ordinator, has worked on the Osh events at the same time, and has been 
researching social relations in rural Aravan since 1995. 
We conducted 28 open-ended interviews in Aravan. Interviews were conducted with 
community leaders who played key roles in preventing the violence, local state officials who 
assisted the negotiation process, and ordinary community members who participated or 
witnessed negotiations/talks to bolster peace. We have sought to interview key actors from 
both Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities. 
In particular, we interviewed the following key actors in Aravan: Paizulla 
Murzabaranov,  head of the Aravan administration (2010-2011); Shamil Artykov, former 
head of the Aravan raion administration (2009-2010; 2011-2015); Iskander Gaipkulov, 
Deputy of Kyrgyz Parliament (2005-2009) and head of the Accounts Chamber (2009-2010); 
Tillavoldieva Maharam, director of “Mehr-Shavkat,” local NGO that focuses on community 
mobilization for poverty reduction; Jalolidin Hajji, chairman of Allya Anarov local 
government (2014-2015) and a businessman; and Mamasaidova Omina, former head of 
Women's Association of Aravan and a wife of Mukhamedjan Mamasaidov, a former deputy 
of Kyrgyz Parliament  and the former rector of Kyrgyz-Uzbek University.   
In conducting the analysis, we have also relied on several streams of data: i) desk 
review of published material on the subject (reports on the June 2010 violence by journalists, 
scholars, and government officials); ii) interviews with civil society activists, community 
members and social groups in Bishkek and Osh; iii) interviews with development specialists 
and conflict prevention experts in Bishkek and Osh; iv) data obtained from the authors’ 
fieldwork in South Kyrgyzstan conducted over an extended period of time.  
In interviews, we posed different questions to key actors and non-elites. To gain 
understanding of the timeline of the events, we asked broad questions: How did you find out 
about the gathering/mobilization of people? How many people did you see? How did people 
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get to the place of mobilization? What did people demand? What did you do during the 
gathering? 
These questions were useful because they helped distinguish among three categories 
of people: those who were directly engaged in the events; those who saw them, and those 
who heard about them. We sought to get the most information from the direct participants of 
the events. When the direct participants were unavailable, or they could not recollect 
information, or they provided conflicting accounts of the events, we relied on interviews with 
direct witnesses of the events (people who said they saw).  
When interviewing key actors, we posed the following questions: What did local 
activists do to stop the violence in Osh/Aravan? Why did such efforts succeed/fail? Why did 
violence erupt in Osh but not in nearby towns such Aravan?  
 
3: The tale of two towns: socioeconomic differences between Osh and Aravan:  
In the introductory section, it was pointed that that important structural differences 
between Osh and Aravan accounted for different outcomes during the June 2010 violence. 
Unlike Osh, Aravan did not witness massive in-migration of rural residents and a 
correspondent change in the demographic profile over the past two decades. The purpose of 
this section is to detail the difference in the level of in-migration and the changes in the 
demographic profiles of the two towns.  
At first glance, Osh and Aravan share some resemblances.  Geographically, both are 
located in Osh oblast in close proximity to the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. In terms of population, 
both are inhabited primarily by the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. But the differences between them are 
remarkable.  With a population of 270 thousand people, Osh is the second largest city in the 
country (Kyrgyz Republic population census, 2009) and an important regional trade center. 
Located twenty-seven kilometers to the west of Osh and divided into two administrative 
districts (run by separate local governments) – Anarov and Yusupova, Aravan has 39 
thousand people.  
 Migration patterns also differed in the two areas. Amidst the economic turmoil of the 
early 1990s, many rural residents from South Kyrgyzstan (including Alai, Kara-Kulja, Chon 
Alai, and Batken raions) migrated en masse to Osh to find employment, swelling the 
population of Osh to 500,000 by 2015.3 As Osh's population has swelled, competition among 
the residents for scarce resources such as arable land, water, and market stalls has intensified. 
The population of Aravan has increased since 1991, but it was largely due to natural 
population growth. The 2009 national census data for the Aravan raion (of which Aravan is 
part of) indicates that in 1989, the raion population was 71 214; in 1999, it reached 91 438; 
and in 2009, it stood at 106 134 people (Kyrgyz Republic population census, 2009, p. 25). 
Ethnic groups inhabiting the raion are: Uzbeks (58 percent), Kyrgyz (39 percent).  
 In the post-independence years, Osh also witnessed an informal division of sectors 
whereby the Uzbeks have come to predominate in trade in the bazaars and the Kyrgyz have 
established a dominant position in state administration and law enforcement. Interviews with 
Osh residents indicate that this informal division of sectors has not been conducive to 
creating multiple and cross-cutting relationships between and among the residents. In Aravan, 
ties between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks have been denser and more cross-cutting than in Osh. Under 
the Soviet rule, Aravan's Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents were divided by the two kolhozes – 
Communism and Partsiezd, and the past relationships forged during collective work in the 
kolhozes lingered on into the post-Soviet period. Whereas the Osh state administration 
employs few ethnic Uzbeks, the two local governments in Aravan employ a mix of Kyrgyz 
and Uzbeks. For example, the head of one of Aravan’s Anarov district has a mixed 
 7 
background (his mother is Uzbek and his father is Kyrgyz). The head of the Yusupov district 
is ethnically Uzbek, but many of his subordinates come from Kyrgyz background. The 
Aravan police also employs several Uzbeks.  
 Osh and Aravan differ when it comes to stability of leadership and elites as well. 
Because Osh is larger and strategically more important, decision-makers in Bishkek have 
sought to control the city through appointing loyal figures. As a result, cadre reshuffles in the 
mayor's office and the state administration of Osh oblast are a frequent occurrence. The 
changes in the leadership in Bishkek (as the consequence of the March 2005 and the April 
2010 revolutions) contributed to instability of elites in Osh.  
The cases of Osh mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov, and the head of Uzbek Cultural 
National Society, Jalaldin Salakhutdinov, are instructive. Appointed by former President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2009, Myrzakmatov emerged as a popular mayor due to his ability to 
efficiently address the city’s problems such as pollution and worn-out infrastructure. But 
as Myrzakmatov's political independence from Bishkek grew in subsequent years, especially 
after the April 2010 events and the 2010 Osh violence, he became a threat to Bishkek. 
Myrzakmatov was charged with embezzlement in 2013 and was forced to flee the country in 
2014. Salakhutdinov, who reportedly was Bakiyev’s personal friend, gained prominence in 
Osh for his ability to defend the interests of Osh’s Uzbek entrepreneurs relying on back-door 
channels to President Bakiyev. When Bakiyev was ousted in April 2010, Salakhutdinov’s 
influence in Osh waned. In the wake of the June 2010 events in Osh, Salakhutdinov 
reportedly fled to Uzbekistan to avoid retribution from nationalistic groups.  
Because Aravan lies on the fringes of Osh oblast, authorities in Bishkek rarely 
interfered with Aravan's local politics. The head of the raion administration had changed 
twice since 2010, but when it comes to local governments, cadre reshuffles have been rare. 
For example, the head of Yusupova local government has been in office since 2005. And the 
head of the head of the Anarov local government has kept his job since 2012.  
The differences in the population size explain variation in the links between the 
officials and the residents. In a large city such as Osh, the mayors and their 
subordinates know deputies of Osh city council and the heads of the neighborhood 
committees. But as an Osh official admitted, it is impossible for them to know each and every 
resident in the city.4 Because of Aravan's smaller size, the heads of the local governments 
have personal relations with many residents. As the head of Aravan’s Anarov district boasted, 
he knows the majority of his district’s residents.  
 
4. Why did violence occur in Osh?  
In the introductory section, we argued that the role played by local elites account for 
the differences in outcomes between Aravan on one hand and Osh on the other. This section 
demonstrates that local activists in Osh could not stop the violence because they were unable 
to coordinate amongst themselves and because they lacked “vertical” ties to the crowds of 
mobsters that attacked Osh neighborhoods. First, we present a brief chronology of events in 
Osh, which will be followed by analysis of the role of Osh elites. As our research was in 
Aravan, this argument is based on a reading of the secondary literature and is used to provide 
a contrast to Aravan. 
Events in Osh– a chronology 
 Between April and June 2010, as the provisional government struggled to restore 
order and gain legitimacy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan found itself in a state of semi-anarchy. 
Against this backdrop, interethnic tension was building up across South Kyrgyzstan. A series 
of small brawls between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths were reported. For example, on April 
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29, a brawl between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted after a Kyrgyz criminal gang 
reportedly attempted to extort money from a group Uzbek car traders near the Osh railway 
station (KIC report 2011).  
 These smaller incidents were a prelude to a major disaster that would erupt on the 
evening of June 10. A stand-off between a crowd of Uzbek youths and the police near Alai 
hotel in the central part of Osh had escalated into violence that night. The conflict reportedly 
erupted following an alteration between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths in a nearby café. As 
the size of angry crowds swelled to approximately 1500, the vastly outnumbered police called 
in reinforcements and detachments from the Osh military garrison. When several-hours long 
negotiations produced little results and the unruly crowds began throwing stones at the police 
and smashing the windows of nearby shops, the police and military detachment 
soldiers resorted to the use of live bullets, killing several men in the crowd and bystanders.  
 Although the use of lethal force allowed the Kyrgyz law enforcement forces 
to disperse the Uzbek crowds, the incident sent shockwaves rumbling across South 
Kyrgyzstan, fueling various unsubstantiated rumors. One (false) rumor was that Uzbek men 
had perpetrated a mass rape of Kyrgyz students in a nearby dormitory. According to another 
rumor, hordes of Kyrgyz men were descending on Osh to wreak havoc and cause the mass 
exodus of the Uzbek community. Although these rumors were unsubstantiated, Uzbek 
residents began erecting barricades in their neighborhoods across the city of Osh.   
 Meanwhile, the rumor about the Uzbek mobilization and the mass raping of Kyrgyz 
students had quickly spread across the country and galvanized Kyrgyz residents, especially in 
the southern regions. The 2011 KIC report provides details of Kyrgyz mobilization: 
 
Large crowds of Kyrgyz began to gather, concentrated in two major areas [of Osh 
city]. In the western district, hundreds of local Kyrgyz assembled at the roundabout at 
the crossroads of Osmonova and Podgornaya Streets. By midmorning on 11 June, 
their number had grown to about 5,000, supplemented by from villagers from Leilek, 
Kadamjai and Kyzylkiya regions in Batken Province and Nookat and Aravan regions 
in Osh Province. In the east, at the Furkhat roundabout at the entrance to Osh city, 
again local Kyrgyz numbering in the hundreds in the early hours of the morning, were 
augmented by Kyrgyz villagers from outside, in particular from Mady, Gulcha, Chon-
Alai and KaraKulja. By mid-morning, according to some estimates, their numbers 
reached several thousand.   
 
Emboldened by their swelling numbers, the Kyrgyz men attacked nearby police and 
military stations, seizing weapons, ammunition and military vehicles.  
Responding to the reports from the Osh police, the provisional government declared a 
state of emergency on June 10, introduced a curfew in South Kyrgyzstan, and dispatched a 
delegation of high-ranking authorities. But that did little to stop the violence. The Kyrgyz 
crowds descended on Osh neighborhoods from several sides in the early hours of June 11. 
When military vehicles, which unruly crowds seized from Kyrgyz army, brought down the 
barricades hastily erected by the residents in Uzbek neighborhoods, extensive burning, 
looting, and killing ensured. The KIC report provides disturbing details of the atrocities  
 
At 1.30pm, an APC, followed by armed men, penetrates the Cheremushki mahalla. 
Many Uzbeks are beaten or shot, women raped and houses burnt. Near midday, an 
APC followed by a Kyrgyz crowd enters the mahalla [near the Al-Hakim hospital] 
near the clothing market. Houses are burned and many are killed. 
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Violence continued unabated the next day, on June 12. Military vehicles, which were 
driven by unruly men, broke into such Uzbek neighborhoods as Majrimtal, Cheremushki, and 
Furkhat. Later in the day, attackers descended on Onadyr district, Navoi street, Teshiktash, 
and Shait Tebe neighborhoods. As the Uzbek barricades came down, "wholesale looting, 
murder, and arson took place" (KIC report 2011).  
 On June 13, isolated cases of killing and looting continued, but large-scale violence 
began to subside as the blockade of the conflict zones by the police and military detachments 
had reduced the supply of food, and the rampaging crowds turned into hordes of looters and 
hostage-takers. On June 14, Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies, reinforced by the arrival of 
police troops from Bishkek, began to regain control over the city. Spooked by rising police 
and military presence, crowds of attackers slowly disappeared from the city streets. On June 
15 and 16, the police units assumed full control over the city and began patrolling Osh streets, 
enforcing the curfew, and removing the barricades in Uzbek neighborhoods (KIC report 
2011).  
 
Events in Osh– analysis 
In late April and early May 2010, as reports of inter-ethnic brawls increased, local 
authorities in Osh engaged in a plethora of activities to reduce tension and prevent a major 
clash. For example, on May 2, the Osh mayor's office formed an advisory council consisting 
of representatives of Osh police, NGOs, courts of the elderly (dispute adjudication 
groups), and neighborhood committees to ensure law and order in the city. The local 
authorities also requested neighborhood committee leaders to form community patrols 
groups, which would serve as early-warning mechanisms for potential community violence. 
The authorities also reached out to owners of Osh's martial arts schools and athletic clubs to 
provide "muscle support" for community patrol groups. (KIC report 2011). The Osh governor 
Sooronbai Jeenbekov, Osh mayor Myrzakmatov and the head of the Osh city council 
Davlatbek Alimbekov visited various Osh districts to meet with residents and to calm them. 
They were often accompanied by Osh police chief Kursan Asanov and Uzbek leaders such as 
Jalaldin Salakhutdinov, chairman of Uzbek National Cultural Center, and 
Inomjon Abdirasulov, former deputy of the Kyrgyz Parliament (KIC report 2011).  
 The trio of Asanov, Salakhutdinov, and Abdirasulov played instrumental roles in 
defusing the isolated brawls in Osh's districts (Ponomarev, 2012) between April and mid-
May 2010. For example, Salakhutdinov and Asanov were dispatched by the Osh city 
authorities to defuse tensions following the April 29 brawl near the railway station. 
Approximately 300 Uzbek young men gathered in a nearby school, demanding that the Osh 
police arrest the Kyrgyz men who attempted to extort money from Uzbek entrepreneurs. The 
Uzbek crowd dispersed after a meeting with Salakhudinov and Asanov.  Salakhutdinov and 
the Osh police chiefs assured the Uzbek crowd that they would find the individuals who 
engaged in racketeering.  
 Their ability to disperse crowds stemmed from several factors. First, each of them had 
a reputation as a strong leader with powerful ties in both Bishkek and Osh. A wealthy 
entrepreneur, Abdirasulov previously financed the construction of schools and mosques in 
various parts of the Osh province. Owing to his personal friendship with former President 
Bakiyev and his wealth, Salakhutdinov was the most influential Uzbek leader prior to April 
2010 events. Although he lacked political influence and wealth, Asanov enjoyed the 
reputation as an honest and impartial police officer in Osh. As Ponomarev's report claimed, 
"the analysis of the existing data indicated that despite the rise in inter-ethnic tensions, the 
leaders of Osh Uzbek diaspora engaged in active collaboration with law enforcement 
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agencies, assisting in the stabilization of the situation and preventing potential escalation of 
street conflicts” (Ponomarev, 2012).   
 Two developments had ended the collaboration between the Uzbek leaders and the 
Osh authorities in subsequent days. First, following the May 19 Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash in Jalal-
Abad, Kyrgyz nationalists pressured the provisional authorities in Bishkek to arrest the leader 
of Jalal-Abad Uzbeks Kadyrjan Batyrov whom they accused of separatism. Because of their 
business and political ties to Batyrov, Abdirasulov and Salakhutdinov also became targets of 
harassment by Kyrgyz nationalist groups, and they were forced to keep low public 
profiles. Second, on May 25, the provisional authorities in Bishkek relieved Asanov of his 
duties and transferred him to Bishkek. Authorities in Bishkek did not provide explanation 
about this transfer, but ostensibly this was done because they needed Asanov to help maintain 
law and order in Bishkek. Bolot Nyshanov, former head of Interpol bureau in Bishkek 
who replaced Asanov, lacked a nuanced understanding of a complex situation in the south 
(Ponomarev, 2012). Moreover, he lacked crucial ties to the Osh Uzbek leaders.  
 When the Uzbek crowd of 1500 men confronted the Kyrgyz police on the night 
of June 10 near Alai hotel, Osh authorities were unprepared to deal with the crisis. In the 
absence of Salakhutdinov and Abdirasulov — they were in Tajikistan where they were 
meeting with Batyrov – the leadership of Osh province and the city dispatched Osh oblast 
police chief Bolot Nyshanov, Shukhrat Sabirov, deputy mayor, and Shakir Zulimov, deputy 
head of Osh oblast police, to talk to the crowds (Ponomarev, 2012). Zulimov recollected that 
he knew many Uzbek youth leaders in that neighborhood, but when he and his colleagues 
arrived at the site, he saw many men whom he could not recognize in the crowd. "There are 
many provocateurs among you, don't listen to them," he told the gathered men, but his 
warning was ignored (Ponomarev, 2012). The attempts to convince the Uzbek crowd to 
disperse continued for several hours.  As the negotiations stalled, some Uzbek men in the 
crowd became unruly and began throwing stones at the police and began setting fire to 
nearby buildings. After a stone hit Zulimov's head, he was evacuated from the scene. In 
response to the escalation of violence, the Osh police detachments and the military troop 
reinforcements began to fire live weapons at the crowd.  
 The use of live bullets dispersed the Uzbek crowd, but the rumors about the Uzbek 
atrocities began to spread in South Kyrgyzstan with a lightening speed, galvanizing Kyrgyz 
communities in the eastern and western areas of Osh oblast. In subsequent hours, amidst 
reports of a massive build-up of Kyrgyz crowds in the outskirts of Osh, local officials 
attempted to have negotiations with Kyrgyz crowd leaders. But such attempts were futile. 
The heads of Kara Kulja and Alai rayon appealed to crowd leaders to disperse, but their calls 
were ignored. The Osh mayor's appeal for calm, which was broadcast by local media, was 
also ignored by the unruly crowds.  
 A delegation from the Provisional Government assumed control over the city. But 
as General Ismail Isakov, the Minister of Defense and the Special Representative of the 
Provisional Government for Southern Kyrgyzstan during the June events admitted, "nobody 
knew what was going on‟ (KIC 2011).  Isakov also told the KIC that "not all the troops in 
Osh obeyed lawful commands. This included both the military stationed in Osh and two 
companies of troops flown from Bishkek to Osh on 11 June” (KIC report 2011). The Osh 
Commandant Bakhytbek Alymbekov told the KIC that he was powerless during the June 
events. As the KIC report indicates, "he arrived in Osh as part of the Provisional Government 
delegation early on 11 June. He stated that the only troops he could control were the 50-70 
strong riot police regiment flown from Bishkek… Alymbekov stated that he was confused 
and did not know what to do." (KIC report 2011).  
5: Averting violence in Aravan  
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The previous section demonstrated that the ability of the elites in Osh to coordinate 
amongst themselves was impaired by a series of events. Moreover, Osh leaders lacked 
“vertical” ties to the crowds of mobsters that attacked Osh neighborhoods. Unlike Osh 
leaders, local activists in Aravan maintained direct personal ties with and control over people 
who mobilized in response to the outbreak of violence in Osh. This section details how they 
utilized both “horizontal” ties with each other and “vertical” connections with the crowds to 
prevent deadly inter-ethnic clashes.  
Events in Aravan – chronology and analysis 
 Between 9 am and 12 pm on June 11, the news about the violence escalating in Osh 
reached Aravan, causing confusion, disbelief, and panic.5 Throughout the morning and 
afternoon, hundreds of Aravan (Uzbek) residents fled toward the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in the 
hope that they would manage to cross the border and find safety on the territory of 
Uzbekistan.6  
At 1 pm, amidst much chaos and confusion about the events in Osh, a crowd of 
approximately 150 young men gathered in Aravan’s center (Ponomarev 2012).78 Various 
demands were made by people in the crowd: some called for immediate armament of Uzbeks; 
others shouted that Uzbeks should head to Osh to aid ethnic Uzbeks there. Local officials 
attempt to calm down the crowd and persuade them to disperse, but the youngsters appeared 
to pay little attention to the arguments presented by local officials.9    
 As more people joined in (swelling the crowd to more than 500 people), the crowd 
became unruly (Ponomarev 2012). A group of youngsters broke away from the larger crowd 
and blocked the central road near the main government building. Another group of young 
men attacked four police officers (all ethnic Kyrgyz) who were nearby to seize weapons from 
the police.10 Chasing the fleeing police officers, the mob stormed into a government building, 
beat up the police officers and set fire to two government vehicles.11  
 At around 5 pm, emboldened by their success, the mob then attacked the Aravan 
police station, which was being protected by a handful of ethnic Kyrgyz police officers.12 
Meanwhile, another crowd of Uzbek youngsters attacked the building of Aravan Prokuratura 
(Prosecutor’s Office).  
Aravan’s Uzbek leaders could not stop the unruly crowds, but they recognized that 
they needed to act fast to prevent inter-ethnic clash with the Kyrgyz residents of nearby 
villages. Maharam Tillavoldieva, the director of “Mehr-Shavkat,” a poverty-reduction NGO, 
reached out to Uzbek leaders such as Tursunbai Alimov, deputy head of the Aravan raion, 
Jalolidin Hajji, a prosperous businessman and a respected community leader, and Amina 
Mamasaidova, the wife of a former MP and Rector of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University. The 
Uzbek leaders agreed that they needed to reach out to Kyrgyz leaders and coordinate with 
each other to stop violence from spreading.13  
 
Developments in Aravan’s Kyrgyz villages 
Disturbed by the developments in Aravan and concerned for the safety of their 
villages, between 300 to 500 Kyrgyz men from such Kyrgyz villages as Mangyt, Kerme Too 
and Tuya Moyu, gathered in Yeti Ogayni district of Aravan in the afternoon of June 11. Some 
people called for marching toward Aravan and dispersing the Uzbek crowds, whilst others 
suggested sacking Uzbek neighborhoods. But the presence of Kyrgyz leaders such as 
Iskander Gaipkulov and Shamil Artykov, former head of the Aravan raion administration, 
had a powerful pacifying effect on the agitated crowd. Both Gaipkulov and Artykpov called 
the gathered to remain calm and maintain discipline within their ranks.14  
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 At 3 pm [June 11], Iskander Gaipkulov and his bodyguards drove in several cars to 
Aravan in an attempt to find and talk to Uzbek leaders, but he was forced to flee back to Yeti 
Ogaini because a mob of Uzbek youngster attacked their cars.15 Shaken by the attacks on his 
entourage, Gaipukulov called some Uzbek leaders and accused them of passivity.”16 Back in 
Yetti Ogani, Gaipukulov saw a large crowd of Kyrgyz men some of whom arrived from Osh 
to aid Aravan’s Kyrgyz. The crowd grew agitated after hearing stories of the Kyrgyz police 
officers who were beaten up by ethnic Uzbeks.17  
Relying on their pre-existing relations with youth leaders and their authority as 
community leaders, Iskander Gaipkulov and Shamil Artykov threw the full weight of their 
influence to attempt to dissuade people in the crowds from undertaking unlawful acts. They 
informed the Kyrgyz crowd that they had called the authorities in Osh and requested that they 
send a military detachment to quell unrest in Aravan.18  
 According to Artykov, he and Gaipkulov took the following measures to calm the 
Kyrgyz crowd:  
 
We had 10-15 well-built and armed guys whom we told to keep an eye on agent-
provocateurs and to maintain the barricade that we built near the entrance to Aravan. 
The agent-provocateurs who were there accused us of treachery, but we did not listen 
to them. To weaken the arguments of provocateurs, we told people the following: 
“Uzbeks have weapons, and if we will decide to descend on Uzbek villages, many 
innocent people will die. Do you want that?”… We also told the crowds that there 
was a possibility that Uzbekistan will move in its military forces to protect Uzbeks.  
 
 At around 6 pm on June 11th, the group of Uzbek community leaders identified in the 
previous section (Maharam Tillavoldieva, Amina Mamasaidova, and Jaloliddin Hajji) arrived 
in Yetti Ogaini for talks with Kyrgyz leaders.19 This was arguably a risky move to make, 
given the very real potential for lethal violence. In interviews, Maharam Tillavoldieva said 
that she and Omina Mamasaidova initially had concerns about their safety if they went to 
Yetti Ogani for these talks.20 But the fact that Shamil Artykov called her ahead of the meeting 
and gave her assurances that the Uzbek leaders would be safe convinced them to go to Yetti 
Ogaini.  During the meeting, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek leaders agreed that they would work 
jointly to defuse the crisis and not allow the Uzbek and Kyrgyz crowds from attacking each 
other.21 Gaipukulov assured the Uzbeks that the Kyrgyz men who were controlled by him 
would serve as a buffer between Osh and Aravan to prevent the passage of rampaging crowds 
from Osh.  
At 6:30 pm, a military detachment of 30 servicemen and a BTR armoured personnel 
carrier, which had been called in earlier by Gaipkulov, arrived from Osh22 and dispersed the 
rampaging crowd of youngsters near the police station by firing shots in the air.23 Later that 
night, Gaipkulov met with Shamil Artykov, Koshiev Asan (Aravn police chief), Paizulla 
Myrzabaranov (head of the raion administration). During the meeting, Myrzabaranov agreed 
to temporarily relinquish his powers and Shamil Artykov would serve as the coordinator of 
the Aravan Committee for Restoring Stability, an informal structure that would play the role 
of government.24  
Developments on June 12 
At 10:00 am [on the morning of June 12th], local officials from all of the villages 
adjacent to Aravan, heads of the neighborhood committees, local NGO activists, elders, and 
ordinary community members came to the meeting organized by the Aravan Committee for 
Restoring Stability (henceforth ‘the Committee’).25 The meeting produced a number of 
outcomes. First, Shamil Artykov was chosen as the head of the Committee. The meeting 
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attendants also agreed that the Committee would temporarily serve as the government of 
Aravan, and local law enforcement bodies would be subordinated to the Committee. 
Additionally, a telephone hotline would be set up to receive information about anti-social 
behavior, complaints and grievances from community members. Local officials and 
neighborhood committee leaders assumed the task of working with the police to restore order 
and remove the barricades that residents had constructed to prevent potential infiltration of 
rampaging crowds. Finally, it was agreed that the central bazaar would open doors the next 
day to stop potential food shortage. 
In the afternoon, Artykov, Gaipkulov and other members of the Aravan committee 
went to the town of Chekabad to meet with Uzbek residents who set up a camp near the 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek boundary. As Gaipkulov recollects, “I told the Uzbek crowds that they were 
safe and that they can go back to their houses.” Heeding Gaipkulov’s call, the majority of 
Aravan residents who found refuge in Chekabad returned to their homes.  In the late 
afternoon [of June 12th], the Committee organized a communal feast of plov (rice and mutton) 
in one of Aravan’s districts, an event that brought together Kyrgyz and Uzbek elders and 
local officials.  
  
Subsequent developments 
As violence subsided and order returned to southern Kyrgyzstan, community 
members across Aravan likewise began to disassemble the barricades on June 13 and 14. The 
Aravan Committee for Restoring Stability continued to coordinate various community groups 
that that were involved in bringing Aravan residents from Osh. Under the guidance of the 
Committee, the Aravan bazaar reopened and traders returned to their stalls. The Committee 
offered assistance to local farmers in delivering their produce to market in Osh. Aravan 
residents also organized several shipments of humanitarian aid (mainly agricultural produce) 
to the neighbourhoods of Osh that were hit hardest by the violence.  
It is reasonable to claim that Aravan had a narrow escape from the type of destructive 
violence that devastated not only larger cities in southern Kyrgyzstan, but also towns of 
similar size to Aravan such as Bazar-Korgan. In recognition of the role played by key actors 
in averting the violence, on June 14, acting Kyrgyzstani President Roza Otunbayeva visited 
Aravan and attended a gathering convened by the Aravan committee.26  In her remarks about 
the violence in Osh, Otunbayeva laid the blame for the unrest on deposed President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev and commended Aravan residents for preserving stability. She also hailed 
Aravan as an example of interethnic harmony and collaboration.  
On June 15, the Committee dissolved itself, and the Aravan raion administration has 
resumed its activities. Nevertheless, members of the Committee continued to provide support 




 On June 9 and 10, 2010, the interethnic violence sweeping southern Kyrgyzstan 
threatened to engulf Aravan, as angry crowds of rival young men gathered to fight what many 
on each side saw as an existential threat to their community. Yet five days later the interim 
President visited this out-of-the-way sleepy border town to praise it and its leaders as 
examples of interethnic harmony. 
This paper has advanced two explanations as to why the residents of Aravan managed 
to avoid the violence associated with Osh and Jalal-Abad. Structural conditions which 
facilitated the role played by local elites account for the differences in outcomes between 
Aravan on one hand and Osh, Jalal-Abad and Bazar-Korgan on the other.  
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Firstly, structural differences between urban centres and smaller towns matter. Unlike 
Osh and Jalal-Abad, Aravan has not witnessed extensive migration of ethnic Kyrgyz over the 
past two decades. Moreover, the settlement patterns of the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz did not change 
much since the early 1990s. The Uzbeks continue to inhabit the central part of Aravan; and 
the Kyrgyz continue to live in neighbouring villages. As a result of this continuity of social 
forms, links between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Aravan have been denser and more cross-
cutting than in Osh and Jalal-Abad. In Osh, much of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek interaction was 
limited to the Osh bazaar and between Uzbek vendors and Kyrgyz customers. Government 
agencies such mayor’s office, various municipal service providers, prosecutor’s office, 
courts, and even non-governmental organizations are predominantly staffed by ethnic 
Kyrgyz. In Aravan, meanwhile, interactions between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have taken 
place on multiple levels. The Uzbeks and Kyrgyz work together in government offices and 
non-governmental organizations. They also work in partnership in numerous farming 
associations. Moreover, there are kinship ties between the two communities as a result of 
centuries-long inter-mixing which had not been seriously disrupted by migration and 
settlement patterns.  
Secondly, these structural conditions created the situation whereby key actors with 
intergroup familiarity and intragroup authority could act swiftly to form the Aravan 
Committee for Restoring Stability and assume and perform extraordinary emergency powers 
that enabled them to quell angry crowds and stand down the apparent provocations to 
violence from isolated outsiders challenging their authority. 
This chapter has sought to fill in a gap in the study of the June 2010 violence. 
Students of the region have devoted considerable attention to the study of the causes of the 
violence, but they have paid insufficient attention to the spatial variation of violence and 
particularly to cases where violence did not occur. Such research is important in itself. But 
beyond that, as John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran observe, Central Asia has long been 
painted by international political, cultural and academic practices as inherently prone to 
ethnic conflict and thus in need of external rescue from the dangers it poses to itself and 
others (Heathershaw and Megoran 2011). Research which uncovers internal mechanisms for 
preventing violence is thus of crucial value to correcting the ‘discourse of danger.’ 
There are several avenues for further search. Grievances and narratives of injustice held by 
ethnic groups alone do not lead to violence; violent encounters are a result of coincidence of 
several factors and escalatory triggers through which a permissive environment facilitates the 
actual outbreak of conflict or violence. It is, therefore, important to look at cases of violence 
to understand actors, their incentives for violence, and mechanisms and triggers by which 
violence erupts and spreads. Unfortunately, little is known about groups of youngsters that 
attacked the urban neighborhoods and engaged in clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. 
 In particular, two further considerations arise from returning to Séverine Autesserre’s 
agenda for ‘emerging and future peacekeeping research.’ Firstly, she warns against idealising 
local practices and asks how their peacebuilding potential can be built on whilst avoiding 
their most unsavoury aspects (Autessere 2014). The ability of key actors in the Committee to 
de-escalate conflict and avoid violence was predicated on their location in local, regional and 
national patronage networks. Because of the weak rule of law, these networks are inherently 
vulnerable and unstable and are themselves productive of the unconstitutional regime change 
that created the power vacuum which in turn precipitated the June violence (Radnitz 2010).  
This should warn us against understanding what happened in Aravan as a simple story 
of bad, violent young men and wise, pacific elders. If elites were able to pacify a dangerous 
situation, does not mean that elites are necessarily inherently agents of peace. Indeed, if the 
causes of peace turn out to be the same as the causes of violence, we are forced to reflect 
carefully on what we mean by peace and violence.  
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Secondly, Autesserre urges scholars to explore how such ‘bottom-up initiatives’ can 
‘contribute to national and international peace’ (Autessere 2014). Here, we would sound a 
note of caution. Although we do think that structural socio-economic factors which facilitated 
the role of key elites are a crucial element of the explanation, our data also points to the 
highly contingent nature of the outcomes in Aravan. Yes, we can tell a story of the skillful, 
timely and brave interventions of key local actors apparently preventing the catastrophe 
happening. But a lot could have derailed the developments we identified. Gaipkulov’s 
derogatory comments about Uzbeks could have prevented the formation of the Committee. 
Had Kyrgyz policemen in Aravan been lynched rather than escaped with a beating, the 
revenge lust might have been uncontrollable.  If the angry Kyrgyz crowd or an agent 
provocateur had attacked, raped or killed the Uzbek community representatives who arrived 
in Yetti Ogayni to defuse the tension, then the Committee might never have been formed. 
And so on.  
Returning to Paul Brass’ work on intercommunal India riots, in the conclusion of his 
book he summarises key variables such as: the precipitating incident; whether or not it 
produces a reaction and counter-reaction; whether it is dramatized through other 
provocations; whether or not the authorities act decisively; and whether a widespread public 
reaction occurs spontaneously or can be generated by agents provocateurs. Surveying these, 
he concludes, “This circularity, which makes prediction difficult and all attempts at casual 
theorizing on such large-scale events ultimately futile, is inherent in the dynamics of riot” 
(Brass 2003). The ability of communities to manage conflict by preventing or de-escalating 
violence will always be contingent – and this is particularly the case in the unstable political 
context of Kyrgyzstan.  
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